True Nobility-- Ernest Hemingway

True Nobility
--by Ernest Hemingway

In a calm sea every man is a pilot.

But all sunshine without shade, all pleasure without pain, is not life at all. Take the lot of the happiest-it is a tangled yarn. Bereavements and blessings, one following another, make us sad and blessed by turns. Even death itself makes life more loving. Men come closest to their true selves in the sober moments of life, under the shadows of sorrow and loss.

In the affairs of life or of business, it is not intellect that tells so much as character, not brains so much as heart, not genius so much as self-control, patience, and discipline, regulated by judgment.

I have always believed that the man who has begun to live more seriously within begins to live more simply without. In the age of extravagance and waste, I wish I could show to the world how few the real wants of humanity are.

To regret one's errors to the point of not repeating them is true repentance. There is nothing noble in being superior to some other man. The true nobility is in being superior to your previous self.



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Miscellaneous quotes from Hemingway

"Happiness in intelligent people is the rarest thing I know."
--E. Hemingway

"I love sleep. My life has the tendency to fall apart when I'm awake, you know?"
--E. Hemingway

"Madame, all stories, if continued far enough, end in death, and he is no true-story teller who would keep that from you."
--E. Hemingway

"If two people love each other there can be no happy end to it."
--E. Hemingway

"Never mistake motion for action."
--E. Hemingway

"Never think that war, no matter how necessary, nor how justified, is not a crime."
--E. Hemingway

"The world breaks everyone and afterward many are stronger
at the broken places."
--E. Hemingway

"'The world is a fine place and worth fighting for.' I agree with the second part."
--E. Hemingway

"It is good to have an end to journey toward; but it is the journey that matters, in the end."
--E. Hemingway

"Hesitation increases in relation to risk in equal proportion to age."
--E. Hemingway

"That is what we are supposed to do when we are at our best -- make it all up --but make it up so truly that later it will happen that way."
--E. Hemingway


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Quotes on Death

"All stories, if continued far enough, end in death."
--E. Hemingway

"There is no lonelier man in death, except the suicide, than that man
who has lived many years with a good wife and then outlived her.
If two people love each other there can be no happy end to it."
--E. Hemingway

"Every man's life ends the same way. It is only the details of
how he lived and how he died that distinguish one man from another."
--E. Hemingway

"Everyone knows they're going to die, but nobody believes it."
--M. Schwartz

"If you accept that you can die at any time-- then you might not
be ambitious as you are."
--M. Schwartz


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漫長的等待

等待自己變成一個全新的人

等待身邊的人事流轉

始終記得"生命沒有過渡"這句話

接下來, 就唯有實踐......


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別人的故事

在女孩子做餅乾織圍巾給男孩子的那個年紀
我卻是動刀動鋸地做了個木頭筆筒
上面用烙鐵畫著我印象中的小六的臉
雖然最後對方沒收下, 而現在那個筆筒好好地躺在家中抽屜的深處
但是當時片段的心情還記得呢
我只想著: 為什麼不晚點相遇
晚一點, 是不是就能有所不同?
當年我才13 歲吧

國中第一次見證了所謂愛情
轟轟烈烈的
主角不是我
是我的阿弟
或許從那時候開始
我就養成了旁觀的習慣吧
為了那段我不是主角的感情出過力
為了男女主角的無奈掉過淚
現在回想都無法理解
那些眼淚, 是如同看著一部浪漫電影而掉的嗎?
或許是預見了自己對感情的態度
所以對於阿弟的愛無反顧產生的欣羨也說不定

直到現在, 十年過去了
阿弟還是個浪漫的傻子
我也如同當年, 常常身為感情的旁觀者
對自己的感情卻無法掌握其中的真實
阿弟說他這次走不出來了
我給他個殘忍的答案: 五年後還沒有下一個弟妹出現, 我再來相信
因為我相信性格是難以改變的
正如我無法變成感情的傻瓜
這個傢伙在愛河裡游泳的習慣也是無可救藥的

後日按: 弟你完全失去信用了~ 五年後你給我的回應是娶進門的可愛弟妹, 以及2011 年你們共同迎接到這世界上的小小新生命.

願我們都學習到愛
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掏空

對我來說
"朋友"是個很奇怪的詞
由於我固執的腦袋
不斷地催眠自己
國中之後, 有些事情就結束了
我的生命, 對自己的觀點
似乎就這樣擱淺在灘上
而我也開始活在過去
或許該說自從高中以後
我就很少回想吧
眼淚已經流乾
於是每當在心底想起"朋友"這個詞
總是只記得國中與國小之前認識的幾個人
事實卻是, 他們已經離開我的生活很久了

整理自己的文章
感慨唯有: 我遺忘了真多
整理信箱
卻是一種怵目驚心
對於大學時期的自己
我簡直一無所知
非常地震撼
我做過這麼多糟糕的事 (真的是非常非常地糟糕噢)
自己卻忘得一乾二淨 (非常非常地乾淨)
這些糟糕與對不起的最大宗莫過於P, S, K, M, D (出場序)
你們的包容讓我認知到了自己所挑戰的身為一個混帳的極限
現在回首
自己都驚訝那是誰--
這樣講起來, 顯然這個兇手完全沒有反省
你們一一為我上了重要的一課-- 人與人的相處, 在不同的面相

信箱容量有上限是個重要的設計啊
否則我或許永遠也不會去想起這一切
也就無從反省了
(所以G-mail的哲學 不適合我)
希望這時候開始把這一切回憶納入我的記憶還不算太遲
O在這一點上, 對我來說是個具有指標意義的朋友
因為我也對於我的高中生活幾乎完全失憶
卻在奇妙的機緣之中 (可說是上天憐憫, 不願讓我失去你吧)
而撿回了你這個朋友
在大學時期裡, 我總算開始記得我們相處的點滴
在我僵化的腦子裡
O也緩慢而逐漸地被歸入國小/國中同學類
也就是終於在我的心中可以稱呼你為"朋友"
是你扣開了我封閉的定義

是的我承認我對於大學的記憶也很淡
並且(as jerk as it is) 認為我沒有朋友 (忽然明白為什麼我很喜歡N)
我真的是個很幸運的人
有了得天獨厚的, 無盡的熱情
又有幸遇到了你們
雖然我是如此地善忘而且有時候可以如此地混帳
請你們不要吝嗇地繼續教導我
什麼是朋友
而我自私地請求著
如果我還沒有學會活在當下, 而還活在過去
如果在多年多年以後, 我想起了你們
希望你們也還記得我
(天哪 開始覺得我是個恐龍 需要這麼多年才會回頭)
而我最希望的是自己逐漸成熟, 不再是以傷害來認識我最深的情感
對不起

如果你的名字沒有出現在以上文章裡
並非你對我而言不重要
而是恭喜你, 因為 (1) 我認為自己(可能)沒有傷害過你, (2) 我們的關係還是進行式
像是我親愛的G, S, C, Q, T, B, I, Y, L, etc.
我會常常愛著我身邊的人
請給我這樣的機會, 讓後知後覺的我, 去認識你們


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短篇

後悔
自從立下不讓自己後悔這樣的人生目標之後
我有多年多年未曾後悔
也始終相信堅持可以改變現況
相信與其後悔當初的選擇, 不如堅持
漸漸發覺
或許
或許的或許
偶爾的偶爾
後悔反而是讓你提早抽身而減低傷害的唯一辦法
而我卻一向固執不願為
就這麼一刻
多年以來
我沒有這麼後悔過

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Outline of The Phenomenological Method

This is a class note created for Heidegger's book Being and Time chapter seven. All quotes below from Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New York: Harper & Row, 1962.

**********************************************************

§ 7 The Phenomenological Method of Investigation

7.1 Theme of phenomenology

7.2 Ontology

7.3 Phenomenology as the research of “to the things themselves”

7.4 Superficial word origin of phenomenology

7.A The Concept of Phenomenon

7.A.1 Phenomenon as something showing itself in itself

7.A.2 Appearing as something announcing itself through

(a) what shows itself

(b) what does not show itself

7.A.3 Mere appearance as what does not make up the real Being

7.A.4 Semblance as something showing itself as what it is not

7.B The Concept of the Logos

7.B.1 Logos as letting something be seen

7.C The Preliminary Conception of Phenomenology

7.5 Meaning of phenomenology from word origin

7.C.1 Phenomenon in ordinary/ formal sense:

Any exhibiting of an entity as itself shows itself in itself

7.C.2 Phenomenon in phenomenological sense:

the Being of entities

7.C.3 What goes to make up Being/ the concept of Dasein

**********************************************************

The theme of phenomenology is about the Being of entities and the meaning of being in general. Although ontology had born this mission in philosophy, the term “ontology” itself does not indicate a clear approach and it has a rather unjustified concept of entity. Phenomenology deals with some themes overlapping with those dealt with by ontology. But rather than asking what the object of research is, we would ask how the research is (Heidegger, 50). Now the meaning of phenomenology proposed by Heidegger is ‘To the things themselves’ and he tried to elucidate not only the term phenomenology itself but also its deeper contents by examining its word origin in Greek in the following sections. What phenomenology is not would be made clear in order to point out the prejudice and problems we face.

According to Heidegger, there are four possible interpretations of the word ‘phenomenon’, namely, phenomenon, appearing, semblance and mere appearance. Only the first one, phenomenon, is what phenomenology wants to reveal, i.e.,

‘that which shows itself in itself (51)’.

This interpretation of phenomenon would constantly be what is being referred to in the phenomenological sense and must not be confused with the followings. The second interpretation, appearing, is

something ‘[announcing] itself through something does show itself (52)’.

Appearing therefore at the same time implies that the something showing itself is not showing itself directly but through the appearance. The appearance can either be ‘something that shows itself’ (mere appearance) or ‘something that does not show itself’ (semblance) of the something showing itself (53). The mere appearance is ‘something which does not make up the real Being of what brings it forth (53)’, just like the fever showing itself as redness in face. On the other hand, semblance is ‘to show itself as something which in itself it is not (51)’. This kind of showing itself can also be referred to as ‘seeming’, such as redness in face after exercise may seem to indicate having a fever.

Now that we clearly distinguish the differences between the four interpretations and adopt the first meaning of phenomenon hereafter, we at the same time open up the concept of entities. To be more specific, we must not presuppose that ‘something appears without being itself an appearance (53)’ and shall ‘leave it open whether what shows itself is an entity or rather some characteristic which an entity may have in its Being (54)’.

From Greek origin, according to Heidegger, the definition of Logos is discourse. Discourse here in the pure apophantical sense is to ‘[let] something be seen in its togetherness with something (56)’. It is very different from the judgment-bearing and unjustified concept of synthesis proposed in psychology, about the mysterious binding of something psychical inside with something physical outside. ‘The function of Logos lies in merely letting something be seen, in letting entities be perceived (58)’.

Taking phenomenon and logos together, phenomenology now no longer stands for just science of phenomena similar to all other disciplines. Phenomenology means ‘to let what which shows itself be seen from itself in every way in which it shows itself from itself (58)’. This understanding is no different from the previous notion that phenomenology is ‘to the things themselves.’ What follows then is a de-formalization of the concept of phenomena from ‘any exhibiting of an entity as it shows itself in itself (59)’ into ‘the Being of entities (59)’. This Being of entities include ‘[the exhibitings] that belong[s] to what shows itself so essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground (59)’. Only in this way can we avoid presupposing the unjustified ‘natural distinction’ between the entity and what belongs to its Being and then start out to examine this relation and phenomena.

Phenomenology is thus the way of access to what is to be the (undefined) theme of ontology. ‘Phenomenon’ in the phenomenological conception is ‘the Being of entities, its meaning, its modification and derivatives (60)’. Bearing this notion in mind, the mission of phenomenology is to rediscover the covered things, and to ‘[grasp] and [explicate] phenomena in a way which is original and intuitive (61)’ yet not in the least naïve or unreflective. We shall no longer think of phenomena as something exhibited; rather, phenomena now become ‘that which shows itself in itself (51)’ behind which there is nothing else (60).


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Perception (Merleau-Ponty)

這部份會以很多Merleau-Ponty 給的例子為主
(企圖)一併介紹perception, intentionality & adumbration
所以會分段
混雜使用不同的標號表示重點應注意的措辭
很多狀況下卻也同時是危險的措辭 (意義不夠明確)

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(2) perception
從所謂的最原始的感知開始
往世界的本質靠近

首先要闡明"感知裡只有物質世界"是不可能的
第一個例子是世界上沒有東西能夠呈現它的每一面
也就是一張桌子在你面前
你可以感知到它是一張桌子
但其實你卻是根據目前你的角度看見的桌子的某一面來判斷它是一張桌子的
也就是你"覺得"或"知道"它是一張桌子的某一面

卻不需要在一瞬間(at a given moment) 取得所有關於這張桌子的物理性資料
可見得在某處有種合成發生著
讓你知道它是一張桌子
不見得牽涉概念(ideal) 或統覺
但至少不只從某個角度看見桌子這麼簡單

第二個例子是你的視覺
在任一瞬間其實都充滿著比你注意到的還要多的資訊
如果說感知真的是純物理性的
那麼你不該錯過任何曾在你視網膜上投影卻不在焦點上的資訊
i.e. 不會有掃過去卻沒注意這種事的發生

其次要闡明感知也不可能是只有心的世界
經典的"顏色"例子出現了
如果顏色本身是一種獨立於物質外的抽象概念
那麼世界上不應該有"白色的房間"這種東西
如果這個房間整間是白色的你就什麼也看不見了
你必須承認在深深淺淺, 不同表面, 不同光影的東西上
"白"以不同的形式出現著
似乎顏色不是一種屬於我們的心念裡的東西
不是你心裡有個顏色的概念
而是那個為你所見的東西以顏色作為它的一個特質

如果我們接受了以上例子裡
--感知既不是純物理的也不是純心念的--這樣的論點
那感知是如心理學或康德所宣稱的
一種內在世界與外在世界的結合嗎? (二元論?)
這種說法對於Husserl 或MP 來說
相當地不負責任
這似乎落入了所謂沒有發覺過的預設
我們問心或物理世界的存在
問它們的交感
卻從未檢視過這樣的"直覺"區分是如何運作的
也就是上次稍碰觸到的幻覺問題

指稱'一個人看見一張不存在的桌子'是他正在產生幻覺
但是其實在你指稱的時候
似乎也會思考出一張桌子該是怎麼樣的才算是完整的桌子 (the full thing)
你是在產生幻覺嗎? 不是
你所想出來的桌子此時此刻存在嗎? 不在
那究竟是什麼區分了你的"想"與他的"想"?
另一個相關的例子是圖像
一張圖片裡有一座橋
那麼當你看見那張圖片時你所感知到的是一張圖片還是一座橋?
似乎有兩種不同層次的感知同時存在
let's say, the figure is bodily-given and the bridge is self-given
如果說你認為這個bodily-given 就是幻覺與真實的判準
那麼是什麼讓我們判斷出他的存在與不在?
試著不要牽涉預設的任何二元立場

提出這些問題之後
要介紹一個MP 的觀念: 背景理論
為什麼你眼前的世界每個東西會是獨立的?
立體的觀念是訓練出來的嗎?
為什麼你眼前的人不會融入背景裡, 而就是會被你當作一個個體來認知
我們的經驗與預設是無法逃躲的
例如我們直接看見景象A 會描述它如下:
一個森林裡的草地, 草地上很多小花
如果我們看見景象B 會這樣描述:
一個森林裡的草地, 草地上有幾隻鹿
如果讓我們先看見景象B 再看見景象A
大多數人卻會回答景象A 裡什麼都沒有
這是接近心理學的範圍了 (所以好危險啊)
但是這樣的背景觀念卻可以解釋上述的幾個問題

(3) intentionality
具體的背景讓我們認知到圖像
就像是我們的視網膜在任一瞬間會有完整的視野
但是我們卻只會認知到其中的圖像而不是背景
像是房間這個空間以及裡面的東西, 可以容納寄托我們認知的白色
像是我們對桌子的概念背景可以讓我們認知到桌子
在此
要區分intentionality 與康德式的框架並不容易
(但是相信我~ 它們真的不一樣啊~ 我太不會講了)

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突然發現自己還是概念不清
無法寫下去 (打擊)
下次繼續接這裡......


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Task of phenomenology (Husserl)

期待已久的現象學第二課開課囉 (有誰在期待嗎 = =a)
總之今天已經很晚了
所以能打多少是多少
先介紹這次的架構:

第一部分會是一段全英文
說明Husserl 眼中現象學的任務
其實這段文字是寫在前篇文章之前
因為讓授課老師讀過
雖然內容會相當重疊,但是信心水準較高
所以直接貼上來
而這段就會直接使用系列文中沒有定義過的字了

接下去的簡介會以定義名詞開始
繼續下去
依序是: attitudes, perception, intentionality, adumbration
and finally, phenomenon
這部份就會以中文寫了
比照上次的原則辦理
避免使用專有名詞
以上說明結束, 正文開始

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According to Husserl, the overall task of phenomenology is to becomea science of essence. There are several attempts in history that try to address the world. But all of them seem to Husserl deviate from the essence of the object. Natural sciences and the like presuppose by experience and only deal with the physical world. Whereas psychology and several branches in philosophy, such as idealism, treat perception of the world as possession of minds. Instead of taking either approach, Husserl proposed the phenomenological epoche, which centered on taking no positing. While taking advantage of the primitive perceptions, Husserl emphasized on the distinction from natural attitudes. In brief, against studying the mere thing or study the world in minds, Husserl advocates to study the essence without dividing it or isolating mind from it; and to treat the thing and all the anticipated in a unity as in primordial perception. Look closely at 'the full thing' through understanding perception and then try to say something about essence.

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(1) attitudes:
其實上次有稍微提到這部份
也就是你對世界的態度是一種根據經驗的假設
像是認為就該有個物理世界
就該有度量衡
一個東西因為遠近距離不同造成視覺上大小不同
但是你不會相信他的大小改變了
而會相信你的比例尺量測出來的東西一樣
他就該是一樣大而沒有改變
這看似簡單的認知
其實有很深的假設(presupposition)
是一種沒有被合理解釋過的東西
但是我們卻不會懷疑它
你到底為什麼覺得東西的大小沒有改變呢?
那個獨立於你以外而存在的世界
大小不會改變的那個東西
你是怎麼去認知到的呢?
又為什麼深信不疑?
如果你可以認同以上的提問的確可以成為問題
你就會又向瞭解現象學多靠近一步
(這的確是對唯物論甚或二元論的人來說很難跨越的吧~)
你的信心來自沒有思考過的假設
紮根於你的物理態度, 你相信那個度量衡
所以這個世界對你來說符合度量衡

現象學的角度裡
將會花很多心力去凸顯很多我們不覺得有假設過的假設
以Husserl 的角度來說
他不打算拋棄這些經驗與成見
因為身而為人這就已經是不可能的了
但是至少認知到這些態度/經驗的影響
把它當作處理世界的本質的一部分
去描述它
會是一件重要的事
激烈一點來說, 比如Merleau-Ponty
會認為你的態度影響你所看見的世界
這是後話了......
但是提出來一下, 之後是不是有機會重訪這部份不確定


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