Outline of The Phenomenological Method

This is a class note created for Heidegger's book Being and Time chapter seven. All quotes below from Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New York: Harper & Row, 1962.

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§ 7 The Phenomenological Method of Investigation

7.1 Theme of phenomenology

7.2 Ontology

7.3 Phenomenology as the research of “to the things themselves”

7.4 Superficial word origin of phenomenology

7.A The Concept of Phenomenon

7.A.1 Phenomenon as something showing itself in itself

7.A.2 Appearing as something announcing itself through

(a) what shows itself

(b) what does not show itself

7.A.3 Mere appearance as what does not make up the real Being

7.A.4 Semblance as something showing itself as what it is not

7.B The Concept of the Logos

7.B.1 Logos as letting something be seen

7.C The Preliminary Conception of Phenomenology

7.5 Meaning of phenomenology from word origin

7.C.1 Phenomenon in ordinary/ formal sense:

Any exhibiting of an entity as itself shows itself in itself

7.C.2 Phenomenon in phenomenological sense:

the Being of entities

7.C.3 What goes to make up Being/ the concept of Dasein

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The theme of phenomenology is about the Being of entities and the meaning of being in general. Although ontology had born this mission in philosophy, the term “ontology” itself does not indicate a clear approach and it has a rather unjustified concept of entity. Phenomenology deals with some themes overlapping with those dealt with by ontology. But rather than asking what the object of research is, we would ask how the research is (Heidegger, 50). Now the meaning of phenomenology proposed by Heidegger is ‘To the things themselves’ and he tried to elucidate not only the term phenomenology itself but also its deeper contents by examining its word origin in Greek in the following sections. What phenomenology is not would be made clear in order to point out the prejudice and problems we face.

According to Heidegger, there are four possible interpretations of the word ‘phenomenon’, namely, phenomenon, appearing, semblance and mere appearance. Only the first one, phenomenon, is what phenomenology wants to reveal, i.e.,

‘that which shows itself in itself (51)’.

This interpretation of phenomenon would constantly be what is being referred to in the phenomenological sense and must not be confused with the followings. The second interpretation, appearing, is

something ‘[announcing] itself through something does show itself (52)’.

Appearing therefore at the same time implies that the something showing itself is not showing itself directly but through the appearance. The appearance can either be ‘something that shows itself’ (mere appearance) or ‘something that does not show itself’ (semblance) of the something showing itself (53). The mere appearance is ‘something which does not make up the real Being of what brings it forth (53)’, just like the fever showing itself as redness in face. On the other hand, semblance is ‘to show itself as something which in itself it is not (51)’. This kind of showing itself can also be referred to as ‘seeming’, such as redness in face after exercise may seem to indicate having a fever.

Now that we clearly distinguish the differences between the four interpretations and adopt the first meaning of phenomenon hereafter, we at the same time open up the concept of entities. To be more specific, we must not presuppose that ‘something appears without being itself an appearance (53)’ and shall ‘leave it open whether what shows itself is an entity or rather some characteristic which an entity may have in its Being (54)’.

From Greek origin, according to Heidegger, the definition of Logos is discourse. Discourse here in the pure apophantical sense is to ‘[let] something be seen in its togetherness with something (56)’. It is very different from the judgment-bearing and unjustified concept of synthesis proposed in psychology, about the mysterious binding of something psychical inside with something physical outside. ‘The function of Logos lies in merely letting something be seen, in letting entities be perceived (58)’.

Taking phenomenon and logos together, phenomenology now no longer stands for just science of phenomena similar to all other disciplines. Phenomenology means ‘to let what which shows itself be seen from itself in every way in which it shows itself from itself (58)’. This understanding is no different from the previous notion that phenomenology is ‘to the things themselves.’ What follows then is a de-formalization of the concept of phenomena from ‘any exhibiting of an entity as it shows itself in itself (59)’ into ‘the Being of entities (59)’. This Being of entities include ‘[the exhibitings] that belong[s] to what shows itself so essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground (59)’. Only in this way can we avoid presupposing the unjustified ‘natural distinction’ between the entity and what belongs to its Being and then start out to examine this relation and phenomena.

Phenomenology is thus the way of access to what is to be the (undefined) theme of ontology. ‘Phenomenon’ in the phenomenological conception is ‘the Being of entities, its meaning, its modification and derivatives (60)’. Bearing this notion in mind, the mission of phenomenology is to rediscover the covered things, and to ‘[grasp] and [explicate] phenomena in a way which is original and intuitive (61)’ yet not in the least naïve or unreflective. We shall no longer think of phenomena as something exhibited; rather, phenomena now become ‘that which shows itself in itself (51)’ behind which there is nothing else (60).